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Abstract
We extend the Kamien and Tauman model of patent licensing by introducing heterogeneous
licensees that differ in their marginal costs using the licensed technology. We show that price
discrimination does not necessarily ensure an efficient allocation of licenses. Moreover, it is
possible that more licenses are sold without rather than with price discrimination.
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In their seminal papers Kamien and Tauman (1984,1986) analyse diﬀerent models of
patent licensing of a process innovation assuming that all ﬁrms on the oligopolistic
downstream market are homogeneous. Their main results are that ﬁxed fee licensing
is superior to royalty licensing and that all ﬁrms will be licensed in case of royalty
licensing whereas the number of licenses in case of ﬁxed fee licensing may be smaller.
Several papers focused on the ﬁrst result and analyzed the conditions under which
royalty licensing can be superior to ﬁxed fee licensing1. This note focuses on the
second result and solves the question if price discrimination can increase the number
of licenses under ﬁxed fee licensing. We extend the model of Kamien and Tauman
by assuming heterogeneous ﬁrms on the downstream market2. We show that in a
ﬁxed fee license game some ﬁrms may not be licensed even if price discrimination is
possible and licensing is costless. Moreover, price discrimination may lead to a lower
number of licenses compared to the situation without price discrimination. Both
results stand in contrast to the well-known result that price discrimination improves
the allocative eﬃciency. The intuition for our ﬁndings is that each ﬁrm’s willingness
to pay is endogenous (and decreasing in the number of licenses) which is not the case
in standard models of price discrimination.
2 The model
We use the model of Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986) as a framework but extend the
model by introducing heterogeneous ﬁrms. Without license, each ﬁrm has constant
marginal costs θ whereas the licensed ﬁrms produce with individual marginal costs
θi with 0 < θi < ¯ θ depending on their ability to implement the innovation. All ﬁrms
are therefore characterized by their individual marginal costs in case of licensing.
Without loss of generality we assume that the ﬁrms are ranked in an increasing
order, i.e. θ1 < ··· < θn. θi is common knowledge, and ﬁxed costs are normalized to
zero. The inverse demand function on the downstream market is p = a −
P
qj with
a > 0 where a − ¯ θ −
Pn
j=1(¯ θ − θj) ≥ 0 ensures that every ﬁrm oﬀers a nonnegative
quantity in equilibrium.3
The game is as follows: In the ﬁrst stage the monopolistic patentee makes (poten-
tially diﬀerent) take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀers to all ﬁrms. In the second stage, ﬁrms decide
1See for example Wang (1998), Wang and Yang (2004) and Sen (2005)
2Wang and Yang (2004) introduced heterogeneous ﬁrms on the downstream market to show
that royalty licensing can lead to higher licensing proﬁts than ﬁxed fee licensing. Mukerjee (2003)
analysed the impact of heterogeneous downstream ﬁrms on welfare.
3This assumption does not restrict the generality of our results since ﬁrms that would produce
a negative quantity in equilibrium will not oﬀer at all resulting in a smaller number of ﬁrms on the
downstream market.
1whether or not to buy a license from the patentee. We assume that it is observable
whether a ﬁrm has bought a license or not. In the third stage, ﬁrms compete in
quantities on the downstream market. Since we consider a game under complete in-
formation, our solution concept is subgame perfectness. We solve by using backwards
induction.
3 Stage 3: Cournot competition on the downstream
market
In stage t = 3, all i = 1,..,n ﬁrms on the downstream market compete in quantities
given the number m of licenses and the index set Im of all licensed ﬁrms j ∈ Im. The
quantity qi(θi,Im) oﬀered by ﬁrm i depends on the ﬁrm’s marginal costs and on the
index set Im of the m licensed ﬁrms.
If ﬁrm i did not acquire a license, it produces with marginal costs ¯ θ. Moreover
it knows that the m licensed ﬁrms j ∈ Im produce with individual marginal costs θj














be the proﬁt function of ﬁrm i that is maximized with respect to qi(¯ θ,Im). Hence,
the reaction funtion is
qi(¯ θ,Im) =
1
n − m + 1







since qi(¯ θ,Im) = q(¯ θ,Im) for all non-licensed ﬁrms.
If ﬁrm i bought a license, it produces with individual marginal costs θi. Fur-
thermore it knows that the other m − 1 licensed ﬁrms j ∈ Im\{i} produce with
their individual marginal costs, and that the n − m non-licensed ﬁrms produce with













be the proﬁt function of ﬁrm i that is maximized with respect to qi(θi,Im). Hence,
the reaction funtion is
qi(θi,Im) = a − θi −
X
j∈Im
qj(θj,Im) − (n − m)q(¯ θ,Im). (4)
2Using the reaction functions we can derive the equilibrium proﬁt levels of the
licensed and non-licensed ﬁrms.
Lemma 1. The equilibrium proﬁt levels are given by
π
NL




a + (n − m)¯ θ +
X
j∈Im
θj − (n + 1)¯ θ
2








a + (n − m)¯ θ +
X
j∈Im
θj − (n + 1)θi
2
∀i ∈ Im (6)
Proof. see Appendix
The equilibrium proﬁt level of ﬁrm i depends on the aggregated marginal costs
of the licensed ﬁrms (each producing with their individual marginal costs θj), on the
aggregated marginal costs of the non-licensed ﬁrms (all producing with high marginal
costs ¯ θ) and on ﬁrm i’s marginal costs, which are θi if i is licensed or ¯ θ if i is not
licensed.
4 Stage 2: Acquisition of a license
In stage t = 2, the licenses are sold as take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀers. A ﬁrm will buy a
license if the gains from the cost reduction are at least equal to the price of the
license. Thus, in equilibrium, ﬁrm i’s willingness to pay is the diﬀerence between its
proﬁt with a license and its proﬁt without a license given that m − 1 ﬁrms aquire a
license as well, i.e.
P(θi,Im) = π
L
i (θi,Im) − π
NL
i (¯ θ,Im\{i}).
Using the equilibrium proﬁt levels derived in stage t = 3, the willingness to pay for a
license is given by Lemma 2:
Lemma 2. The willingness to pay of ﬁrm i given the index set Im is
P(θi,Im) =
n(¯ θ − θi)
(n + 1)2

2(a − ¯ θ −
X
j∈Im




Clearly, the willingness to pay is positive for all ﬁrms and increasing in the individ-
ual cost reduction ¯ θ−θi, but decreasing in the aggregated cost reduction
P
j∈Im(¯ θ−θj)
of all licensed ﬁrms. The reason is that own cost reductions have a smaller impact
on proﬁts if the marginal costs of competitors are low.
35 Stage 1: Pricing of the licenses
In stage t = 1, the patent owner announces the license price pi for each ﬁrm i =
1,...,n. Prices are chosen as to maximize the patentee’s proﬁt Π =
P
i∈Im pi subject
to the restriction Im = {j|P(θj,Im) ≥ pj}. The restriction can be used to restate the
proﬁt maximizing problem such that the patentee chooses the optimal index set Im
to maximize his proﬁt.
We consider two possible pricing mechanisms. Under uniform pricing, all licensed
ﬁrms pay the same price for a license. Under price discrimination, all licensed ﬁrms
pay their individual willingness to pay for a license.
5.1 Alternative A: Uniform Pricing
Under alternative A, all ﬁrms i ∈ Im pay the uniform price p. Given an arbitrary
index set Im, the uniform price must be p = mini∈Im P(θi,Im) to ensure that all i ∈ Im
acquire a license. Thus, the patentee chooses the index set of licensed ﬁrms Im and
the corresponding uniform price p to maximize his proﬁt. For any given number of
licenses m, the highest price p is achieved if the m ﬁrms with the lowest marginal
costs are licensed so that the corresponding uniform price is P(θm,Im). Hence, the
patentee has to derive the optimal number of licenses m that maximizes his proﬁt
given by
Π
UP(m) = mP(θm,Im). (8)
with Im = {1,...,m}. Using (7) and
P
j∈Im(¯ θ − θj) =
Pm
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




The optimal number of licenses m∗ is chosen such that ΠUP(m∗) > ΠUP(m) for all
m 6= m∗.4 To characterize m∗, we deﬁne the marginal proﬁt function as the additional





Using (8) leads to
∆Π
UP(m) = P(m) − (m − 1)(P(m − 1) − P(m)).
Obviously, increasing the number of licenses has a positive and a negative eﬀect for
the patentee. Selling one more license raises the patentee’s proﬁt by P(m) but lowers
the uniform license price from P(m − 1) to P(m) for all other m − 1 licensees.
4Note that the slope of ∆ΠUP(m) may be positive or negative depending on the parameters of
the model.
45.2 Alternative B: Price Discrimination
The patent owner announces the individual price of a license pi for each ﬁrm i.
Therefore, he chooses the index set of licensed ﬁrms Im and the price vector p =
(p1,...,pn) to maximize his proﬁt. Since the patentee can totally extract each ﬁrms’
individual willingness to pay, the price for a license is pi = P(θi,Im) for each i ∈ Im.
If it is optimal for the patentee not to sell licenses to all ﬁrms, he oﬀers licenses at
the price pi = ∞ to all ﬁrms i 6∈ Im.
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 
a − ¯ θ −
X
j∈Im
(¯ θ − θj)

+ (n + 2)
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j∈Im




and allows to maximize proﬁts with respect to the index set Im. Lemma 3 shows that
it is suﬃcient to focus on the index set Im containing the indices of the m ﬁrms with
the lowest marginal costs in order to derive the optimal number of licenses m∗:
Lemma 3. For every number of licenses m ≤ m∗, the index set Im = {1,...,m}
yields a higher proﬁt than any other index set.
Proof. see Appendix
Lemma 3 states that a proﬁt maximizing patent owner will always license the
ﬁrms with the lowest marginal costs. This is not straightforward as licensing a ﬁrm
with higher marginal costs increases the willingness to pay of the other m − 1 ﬁrms
since higher marginal costs lead to a lower total quantity in Cournot competiton, and
therefore increase the proﬁts of the other m − 1 licensed ﬁrms. The Lemma states
that this countervailing eﬀect is always dominated by the loss in willingness to pay of
the mth ﬁrm. We denote the patentee’s proﬁt if the m ﬁrms with the lowest marginal
costs are licensed as ΠPD(m).
To characterize the optimal number of licenses, we deﬁne the marginal proﬁt





Using (9) leads to
∆Π
PD(m) = P(m) −
m−1 X
j=1
(P(m − 1) − P(m)).
5The marginal proﬁt of an additional license contains two eﬀects. Licensing the mth
ﬁrm enables the patent owner to extract the willingness to pay, and thus the whole
surplus from the cost reduction of the mth ﬁrm. But the additional license reduces
the patentee’s proﬁt because the willingness to pay of the other m − 1 licensees is
decreasing due to their lower proﬁts with m instead of m − 1 licenses sold.
5.3 Comparison
Instead of providing a detailed comparison of the optimal number of licenses in case
of uniform pricing and price discrimination, we illustrate our main ﬁndings by nu-
merical examples. This is suﬃcient as our main result is that price discrimination
may reduce the number of licenses sold in the subgame perfect equilibrium, and hence
social welfare. In all of our examples, we assume that the number of ﬁrms on the
downstream market is n = 10, the prohibitive price is a = 200 and that marginal
costs without the innovation are ¯ θ = 20. We only vary the number of one ﬁrm’s
marginal costs when buying a license (see the tables below).
Example 1. Here, marginal costs in cases of licensing are θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 =
0.1,θ5 = 0.7,θ6 = 1.6, θ7 = 1.99,θ8 = 2.0, and θ9 = θ10 = 19. Without price
discrimination the patentee’s proﬁt is maximized if 8 licenses are granted, but with
price discrimination only 7 licenses will be sold.
Example 2. The only diﬀerence to Example 1 is that θ8 increases from 2.00 to
2.10. Then, the optimal number of licenses is 7 both under uniform pricing and price
discrimination.
Example 3. Here, the only diﬀerence to Example 1 is that θ6 decreases from
1.60 to 0.70. Again, the optimal number of licenses under price discrimination is 7,
but only 6 under uniform pricing.
m θm ΠPD ΠUP
1 0.10 919.3 919.3
2 0.10 1707.8 1707.8
3 0.10 2365.3 2365.3
4 0.10 2891.9 2891.9
5 0.70 3266.1 3140.6
6 1.60 3491.8 3158.7
7 1.99 3597.3 3183.0
8 2.00 3595.5 3205.9
9 19.00 3575.4 47.1
































6To understand why the number of licenses can be higher or lower with price discrimi-
nation recall that the willingness to pay is decreasing in the number of licenses. Under
uniform pricing, the price reduction only depends on the diﬀerence in marginal costs
between the m − 1th and the mth licensee. Under price discrimination, however, the
price reduction depends on the individual reduction of each licensees’ valuation. In
example 1, this individual reduction is higher than the increase in marginal costs from
θ7 = 1.99 to θ8 = 2.00 so that it is not proﬁtable to increase the number of licenses
under price discrimination, while it is proﬁtable under uniform pricing. In example
2, the increase in marginal costs from θ7 = 1.99 to θ8 = 2.10 is slightly higher, and
selling 8 licenses under uniform pricing becomes unproﬁtable as well. In example 3,
the increase in marginal costs from θ6 = 0.70 to θ7 = 1.99 is so high that only 6 li-
censes are granted under uniform pricing. However, using price discrimination makes
it proﬁtable to sell one more license since the individual price reduction is suﬃciently
small. We can summerize the results of the examples in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Under price discrimination the number of licenses may be ineﬃ-
ciently low and even lower than under uniform pricing.
Proof. by examples above
The proposition states that the proﬁt maximizing number of licenses under uni-
form pricing may be higher than under price discrimination and that the number
of licenses may be ineﬃciently low under price discrimination. This result stands in
contrast to the well-known result that price discrimination improves the allocative ef-
ﬁciency. Price diﬀerentiation under exogenous willingness to pay leads to an eﬃcient
allocation because it is always proﬁt-maximizing to sell a good to every buyer as long
as the buyer’s willingness to pay weakly exceeds marginal costs. Since valuations
are exogenous there will be no negative impact on other consumers if the number of
consumers is increasing. With licenses sold for a downstream market, however, valu-
ations are endogenous and the indirect eﬀect of rising the number of licenses reduces
the willingness to pay of all licensed ﬁrms (and therefore the patent owner’s proﬁts).
This negative impact may lead to an ineﬃcient allocation.
6 Conclusion
In a simple model with complete information, we have shown that price discrimination
does not necessarily lead to an eﬃcient allocation if valuations are endogenous. Gleave
and Feess (2005) extend the model by introducing asymmetric information about the
marginal costs of the heterogeneous licensees. They show that patent licensing can
be used by ﬁrms with high marginal costs to imitate ﬁrms with low marginal costs if
the number of licenses is revealed by the patentee.
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Appendix
Proof to Lemma 1. Inserting the reaction function of a non-licensed ﬁrm (2) into the














Since this expressions holds for every ﬁrm i ∈ Im we can sum up the equation for all
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θj − (n + 1)θi

.





a + (n − m)¯ θ +
X
j∈Im
θj − (n + 1)¯ θ

.
8Finally, the equilibrium proﬁt levels can be calculated by inserting the optimal quan-
tities qi(θi,Im) and q(¯ θ,Im) into the proﬁt functions (1) and (3).
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2a − 2m¯ θ + 2
X
j∈Im
θj − θi + n¯ θ − (n + 1)θi

=
n(¯ θ − θi)
(n + 1)2

2(a − ¯ θ −
X
j∈Im
(¯ θ − θj)) + (n + 2)(¯ θ − θi)

Proof to Lemma 3. Proof by induction.
Step 1: If m = 1 then ΠPD({θ1}) > ΠPD({θl}) holds for every l > 1.
Step 2: Suppose that the m − 1 ﬁrms with the lowest marginal costs are licensed,
i.e. Im−1 = {1,...,m − 1}. We now have to show that the mth license will be
sold to the ﬁrm with the mth lowest marginal costs. We deﬁne two index sets I1
m =
Im−1∪{m} and I2
m = Im−1∪{l} with m < l and θm < θl. It is suﬃcient to show that
ΠPD(I1
m) − ΠPD(I2
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< 0 (12)
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2(a − ¯ θ) − 2
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(¯ θ − θj) + n(¯ θ − θm) + n(¯ θ − θl)

> 0 (13)
9Recall that we only have to focus on m ≤ m∗, i.e. selling the mth license increases
ΠPD implying that ΠPD(I1
m)−ΠPD(I1
m−1) > 0 and ΠPD(I2
m)−ΠPD(I1
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implying
2(a − ¯ θ) − 4
X
j∈Im−1









n(¯ θ − θl)
(n + 1)2
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2(a − ¯ θ) − 4
X
j∈Im−1
(¯ θ − θj) + n(¯ θ − θl)

implying
2(a − ¯ θ) − 4
X
j∈Im−1
(¯ θ − θj) + n(¯ θ − θl) > 0 (15)
Now, adding (12) and (13) yields




2(a − ¯ θ) − 4
X
j∈Im−1
(¯ θ − θj) + n(¯ θ − θm) + n(¯ θ − θl)

> 0
since θl−θm > 0 and the term in brackets is positive following from (14) and (15).
10